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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifi/Appellee,
vs.
Appellate Court No.: 20030096-CA
MELVIN REDHORSE,
Defendant/Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the entry of judgment denying the motion for new trial on
January 9,2003 is considered to be thefinaldecision of the trial court. See also, Utah
Code §78-2a-3(2)(e). The Notice of Appeal wasfiledon February 3, 2003. Thus,
pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred when it
accepted as nondiscriminatory, the State's explanation for using a peremptory challenge
to exclude a Native American juror. [R. 148: 58]. This issue presents a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The second issue is whether the Court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.
[R. 92]. If the trial court's denial was based upon the facts, it will be reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If the
denial is based upon a determination of law, then the issue presents a question of law,
which is reviewed under the correctness standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860
P2d 937, 938 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. CODES AND RULES
A. Constitutional provisions
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Sections 7, 12.
United States Constitution, Amendment V, VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Mr. Redhorse was charged with theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code § 76-6-404. [R. 1].
B. Course of Proceedings Below
1. A one-count Information was filed against Mr. Redhorse. [R. 1],
2. A jury trial was held. [R. 148-149].
3. Mr. Redhorse was found guilty as charged [R. 86].
4. Mr. Redhorse moved for a new trial. [R. 92-101].
5. The trial court denied the motion. [R. 137-142].
6. Mr. Redhorse filed an appeal. [R. 143-144].
C. Disposition in the Court Below
On September 16,2002, Mr. Redhorse was sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen
2

(15) years. Mr. Redhorse was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of three
hundred seventy dollars ($370.00) and restitution in the amount of eight thousand dollars
($8,000.00) plus interest.
The prison sentence was stayed and Mr. Redhorse was placed on probation with the
following conditions: (1) That Mr. Redhorse pay the fine and restitution at the rate of
two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per month; (2) That Mr. Redhorse provide a DNA
sample; (3) That Mr. Redhorse violate no Federal, State or Municipal law; and (4) That
Mr. Redhorse contact the court if he cannot make payments as scheduled. [R. 89-91].
D. Relevant Facts
Over the course of approximately fourteen (14) years, Mr. Redhorse worked as an
artist for Hozoni Pottery, owned by Craig Simpson. [R. 148: 85]. During that time, Mr.
Redhorse used stencils, that he made at home and at work, with discarded manila files.
[R. 149: 232-233]. In approximately 2001, Craig Simpson sold Hozoni Pottery to Joe
Lyman, owner of Cedar Mesa Pottery. [R. 148:101-102].
Per an agreement between Mr. Simpson and Mr. Redhorse, Mr. Redhorse worked for
Mr. Lyman for thirty days to assist with the transition of Hozoni Pottery into Cedar Mesa
Pottery. [R. 148:136 ]. At the conclusion of the thirty-day period, Mr. Redhorse left
with his stencils. [R. 148: 137]. Mr. Simpson and Mr. Lyman claimed that the stencils
belonged to Cedar Mesa Pottery. [R. 148:104]. Mr. Redhorse believed the stencils were
his. [R. 148: 244].
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Mr. Redhorse was ultimately charged with a second-degree felony theft, in violation
of Utah Code § 76-6-404. He pled not guilty to the charge and a two-day jury trial was
scheduled.
During jury selection, Mr. Redhorse, a Native American, objected to the State's use of
a peremptory challenge to the only full blooded Native American juror1 in a county where
Native Americans are a distinctive group. [R. 148: 58]. The State offered the following
explanation:
Your Honor, I concede that Mz. [sic] Lee appears to be
Native American. I - 1 don't know what her nationality
would be, whether she could be some other - -but I - 1 - she
appears to be Native American. Ah, I didn't want to take off,
ah, to remove the juror entirely for men2, so that -that
removed a couple of challenges that I - that I may have taken.
Um, several of the other jurors I knew or at lease [sic] know have been aware of their families and different things about
them, and so generally speaking, sometimes when I know
someone over someone I don't know, I leave them on.
With regard to — so looking at the others and coming down
to four challenges, I felt that Mz. [sic] Lee was, ah, reserved,
meek, not assertive. Ah, I watched her on several of the
questions and when she spoke, I mink she was fairly quiet3

'The only other juror that was Native American was Jerri Lynn Warren. She is
one-half Native American and one-half Mexican American. [R. 148: 11].
2

There was one male juror. [R. 148: 57].

3

The trial court stated that it wanted to know the background of the jurors, which
included where and how long they lived in San Juan County, their education and degrees,
present occupation, whether married and if married, occupation of spouse, if retired, what
occupation they retired from and if a spouse was retired, what occupation the spouse
retired from. [R. 147: 10]. When it was her turn, Ms. Lee answered as follows:
4

and it's my desire to have someone on the jury that's willing
to be assertive and take a stand and be - 1 mean I think that
serves the prosecution, ah, what? Mentality or purpose more
closely than someone who is meek and reserved. So, ah, with
regard to that, that —that's the reason for my taking her off. I
took her off as my third challenge.

Defendant objected that the prosecution was not entitled to jurors that he knows. [R. 148:
59-60]. Defendant also objected to the generalization that since Ms. Lee was meek and
reserved, she would not take a stand. [R. 148: 60].
In overruling the objection, the trial court stated mat it also found Ms. Lee reserved.
Noting that the reasons did not have to be perfect or even terrific in order to withstand a
challenge, the trial court found that the reason of Ms. Lee being reserved was not

I have lived in San Juan County all of my life and I live in Montezuma
Creek, and my occupation is a Nurse Assistant, working in Cortez
Colorado. And I'm married and my husband's working in Aztec as a truck
driver.
The trial court followed up as follows:
Q. You've got at lease [sic] two years after high school;
right? One year?
A. Yeah.
Q. For a Nurse's Assistant how many - how much education
did you have to have for that:
A. Oh, six months.
Q. Six months. Okay. And did you graduate from High
School? Okay. Thank you.
[R. 148: 16].
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discriminatory. [R. 148: 61].
Mr. Redhorse was subsequently found guilty by the jury. He was sentenced to a term
not less than one (1) year and not to exceed fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison sentence was stayed and Mr. Redhorse was placed on supervised probation for
thirty-six (36) months. He was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of three hundred
seventy dollars ($370.00) and restitution in the amount of eight thousand dollars
(58,000.00).
On September 27, 2002, Mr. Redhorse filed a motion for new trial. [R. 92]. One basis
was juror misconduct. [R. 93]. In support of the motion, two affidavits from two jurors
were submitted.
Juror Shirley Pehrson stated that she overheard a conversation between Juror Amber
Young and Juror Shawna Vigil in the jury room and that one of them made the comment
that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the first day of trial. [R. 136 ].
Juror Jerri Lynn Warren stated during one of thefirstbreaks in the waiting area, Ms.
Vigil commented to Ms. Young that Mr. Redhorse was guilty and further stated that they
should not be talking about the matter. [R. 100].
At the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Warren broke down and cried. During crossexamination, she testified that her vote was forced by Ms. Vigil's racist attitude toward
her during deliberations:
Q. But what I'm asking is tell me what kind of pressure did
they put on you.
A. Okay. When you are told not to talk about it, you do not
6

talk about it until everything is done. Okay. They made me
feel so low that I didn't understand what was being said or
anything, just because of the race I am. And nobody's gonna
stand there and tell me anything, because I know how people
are. I've been living through racism all my life. I know what
it feels like and I know. I had to go to school and I had to deal
with it through school and now I deal with i t . . . And [Ms.
Vigil] made me feel that I wasn't capable of may go [sic] a
decision. She yelled at me and told me, "What part of guilty
do I not understand?" I don't think he was guilty, but I didn't
know I could change my - 1 didn't know I had the right to do
that.
Q. So is there something that these - so Shawna Vigil, you're
saying, said to you, "You don't have to vote," or anything like
that. "You have to vote this way." She said something like
that.
A. She made it sound like that.
Q. How? I need to have you tell me, other than A. She just kept pressuring me and pressuring me and telling
me, "What part of guilty do you not understand?" over and
over and over.
THE COURT: Is that what you took as being race - racially
motivated?
A. No. I know in my own - own words I know how people
talk to me and I can tell they're racism. And I'm not - I'm
not just savin' [sic] it just to help anybody out.
THE COURT: But you doA. I know how it feels, and it doesn't feel too good.
THE COURT: So what I'm asking you is do you —did you
understand her to be acting that way toward you because of
your race.
A. Sorta. And I know she's — she's married into on my
dad's side of the family, but it's — it's hard.
[R 147:11]
The trial court ultimately found that Ms. Warren was not credible:
Warren's dislike for Vigil was evidence and did not appear to
be based on facts. Warren apparently believes that Vigil is a
racist, even though Vigil married Warren's relative. This is
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possible, but not likely. Warren's emotional reaction when
she accused Vigil of racism undermined her credibility.
[R. 139].
With respect to Ms. Pehrson's testimony, she testified that the conversation that she
overheard started before the deliberations, when the jury went into the jury room for a
break. There was one break after the jury was impaneled, but that break was before any
evidence was given. [R. 148: 58].
Upon cross-examination, Ms. Pehrson was clear that it did not take place during
deliberations:
Q. So are you saying this conversation you overheard
occurred in the Jury Room?
A. That's what that room is, yes.
Q. Okay. Was it part of your deliberations?
A.. No. It was at the first part of it.
[R. 148: 25],
The trial court dismissed Ms. Pehrson's testimony, stating that she was confused. [R.
140-141]. The Court denied the motion for new trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it accepted the State's explanations for using a peremptory
challenge to exclude Ms. Lee, a Native American. The explanations given were not clear
or specific. The explanation that the State did not want to strike a male was not neutral
nor was the explanation about Ms. Lee's demeanor.
The trial court abused it discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The trial
court'sfindingsthat Ms. Pehrson was confused and Ms. Warren was lying was not
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supported by the evidence. The predeliberation conversations violated the trial court's
instructions. Those violations combined with the racist treatment of Juror Warren, a
Native American/Mexican American, corrupted the verdict.

ARGUMENT
Point 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ACCEPTED THE
STATE'S EXPLANATION REGARDING THE USE OF A
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

It is well established that the use of a peremptory challenge based solely on race is
prohibited:
Under Batson v. Kentucky [476 U.S. 79, 90, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
901. Ed 2d 69 (1986)] and its progeny, the parties in a
criminal action are prohibitedfromengaging in purposeful
racial discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of
potential jurors . . . Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49,
112 S.Ct 2348, 120 L.Ed. 2d 33 (1992).
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996).
In determining whether a peremptory challenge can withstand a Batson challenge,
the courts have utilized a three-step test:
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a
peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of
racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts
to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a raceneutral explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether the
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrirnination. Purkett v. Elem, [514] U.S. [765], 115 S.Ct.
1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834,839 (1995)(per curiam) accord State
9

v. Cantu, US P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989).
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.
In the case at hand, Mr. Redhorse made a Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use
of a peremptory challenge. The State conceded that the juror was Native American and
offered an explanation. By doing so, the State waived the first step that Mr. Redhorse
make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401,403
(Utah 1996)("Where the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the
sufficiency of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for
the challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is waived.")
quoting Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547.
As for the second step, the prosecutor gave three different reasons. Initially, it was
because he knew more about the other jurors and their families. Then he added that he
did not want an all female jury. Finally, the prosecutor stated that he believed Ms. Lee to
be reserved, meek, not assertive and unwilling to take a stand.
In order to determine if the reasons can withstand a Batson challenge, the trial
court must determine that the reason(s) is (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried,
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate. Higgenbottom, 917 P.2d at 548.
The initial response was that the prosecutor kept jurors whom he knew or had
knowledge about their families. This was not a reason that was related to the case being
tried nor was it legitimate. The prosecution is not entitled to jurors that are known to
10

him.
Additionally, that reason was not clear or reasonably specific: It did not
explain why he chose to strike Ms. Lee instead of another juror. The same is true of the
second reason (that he did not want an all female jury). That did not explain why he
chose to strike Ms. Lee instead of another juror.
More importantly, the explanation that he did not want to strike all the men from
the jury was neither neutral nor legitimate:
[W]hen persons are excludedfromparticipation in our
democratic processes solely because of [either] race or
gender, [the] promise of equity dims, and the integrity of our
judicial system is jeopardized, [citation omitted] Moreover,
the Court categorically stated that "failing to provide jurors
the same protection against gender discrimination as race
discrimination couldfrustratethe purpose of Batson itself."...
Accordingly, [J.KB. v. Alamba, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct.
1419, 128 L.Ed 2d 89 (1994)] mandates that whether the
perceived discrimination involves race or gender, the
responsible party must provide a facially neutral explanation
for the strike or the peremptory challenge violates equal
protection.

State v. Chatwin, 58 P.3d 867, 871 (Utah 2002) cert denied, 67 P.3d 495 (UT 2003):
The fact mat the prosecutor stated that Ms. Lee was reserved, meek and quiet was
based on the briefest of observations. Here, Ms. Lee answered the trial court's limited
voir dire. There is no indication that she was reluctant to answer questions. That the trial
court agreed that she was reserved adds little. Being reserved does not indicate bias nor
does it mean that a person is not assertive or unwilling to take a stand. Yet, that is
11

precisely what the prosecution concluded.
This conclusion disregards cultural differences. There are longer pauses, less
volume and more specific responses to questionsfromNative Americans than Anglos. To
disregard these cultural differences and use that difference as a basis to exclude is race
specific, not race neutral.
The prosecution's concern was that Ms. Lee would be not take a stand against Mr.
Redhorse, another Native American.
Point 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTTON
FOR NEW TRIAL.

In State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held
that although Rule 606 (b), Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits impeaching a verdict by
allowing a juror to discuss what happened during deliberations, the rule should be
different when the fairness of a trial was implicated.
In the case at hand, two jurors engaged in predetermination discussion regarding
Mr. Redhorse's guilt and those two jurors were the same ones that carried the verdict, to
the point that one acted in a racist manner toward a minority juror. Such misconduct
implicates the fairness of the trial and violates due process of law. Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Section 7, United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
Here, both Jurors Pehrson and Warren stated that they overheard comments by
Jurors Vigil and Young. Juror Pehrson testified that she overheard either Juror Vigil or
12

Juror Young make the comment that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the first
day of trial. This was before any evidence was given at trial.
Juror Jerri Lynn Warren stated that during one of the first breaks in the waiting
area, Ms. Vigil commented to Ms. Young that Mr. Redhorse was guilty and further stated
that they should not be talking about the matter. During her testimony, Ms. Warren broke
down and cried, stating that her vote was forced by Ms. Vigil's racist attitude toward her
during deliberations.
The trial court found that Ms. Pehrson was confused and that the comment she
heard took place during deliberations. Thisfindingwas in direct contradiction with Ms.
Pehrson's testimony. She clearly stated that the conversation took place on the first day
of trial, not during deliberations.
The trial court dismissed the testimony of Ms. Warren because it found
implausible the claim mat Ms. Vigil could be racist based on her marriage to a Mexican
American. The trial court also faulted Warren's 'evident dislike' for Ms. Vigil and
found her less credible because she cried during the testimony that she was subject to
racism in the deliberations.
The assumption that a person who is married to a Mexican American would not be
prejudiced against another who is of Mexican American and Native American descent
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding about racism. Furthermore, that Ms.
Warren cried when she testified about the racism or disliked someone who treated her in
13

such a manner are not bases to undermine credibility. To be a victim of racism would be
naturally evoke a variety emotions.
Thus, the trial court's findings were an abuse of discretion.
In the case at hand, Mr. Redhorse had the constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury. See generally, Utah Constitution, Article 1 Section 12, United States
Constitution, Sixth Amendment; Logan City v. Cartsen, 799 P2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("Therightto trial by a fair and impartial jury is an important one which
should be scrupulously safeguarded" quoting State v. Durand, 569 P2d 1107, 1109 (Utah
1977). But, Mr. Redhorse, a Native American, was tried by a jury in which the only
other Native American testified that she was treated in a racist manner and forced into
voting a guilty. In addition, the juror that acted in a racist manner is the one that was
overheard telling another juror that Mr. Redhorse was guilty during a break on the tint
day of trial. A second juror overheard a similar conversation the first day of trial, prior to
any evidence being heard. At best, the appearance of impropriety is raised as to whether
Mr. Redhorse received a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the conviction of Mr.
Redhorse.
DATED t h i s / ^ a a y of August 2003.
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Utah State Constitution
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury6 of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and therightto appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, beforefinaljudgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure rights therein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person by twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
United States Constitution.
Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Sixth Amendment
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy therightto a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed;
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
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